Blanket per-endpoint limits would have been the wrong shape here. Every
REST/WS/MCP surface is owner-only — an unauthenticated request is rejected by
resolve_bearer/is_owner before any handler runs — so limiting them would
mostly throttle the single legitimate operator, and real spend control for
outbound calls is already max_concurrent_calls in gateway.make_call.
What is genuinely exposed is the handful of /auth/* routes that must answer
before an identity exists. /auth/callback and /auth/refresh-callback each make
an outbound token exchange with Casdoor on every request; /auth/me opens a DB
session and runs a token lookup. All are free to trigger and none are cheap to
serve. /auth/logout is left unlimited — it builds a redirect URL and does no
I/O.
Not a defence against credential guessing: PATs are secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
(256 bits) compared by SHA-256 digest, so brute force was never the threat.
This is about unauthenticated work an attacker controls.
Fixed-window, in-process, no new dependency — one operator and one process
make a shared counter store infrastructure without a purpose. The bucket store
is bounded and evicts oldest-first, since an unbounded map keyed by source
address would itself be the exhaustion vector.
The limiter keys on the socket peer and deliberately ignores X-Forwarded-For.
That header is attacker-controlled unless a trusted proxy overwrites it, and
this app establishes no such trust; keying on it would let one client present
as thousands and make the limiter worse than useless. Behind the estate's
reverse proxy the limit is therefore per-proxy, not per-caller — correct for
exhaustion and honest about what it can enforce. Per-caller limits need an
explicit trusted-proxy config, noted in CLAUDE.md so it isn't added silently.
Verified against a real server: exactly 30 requests pass, then 429 with
Retry-After: 60, while an owner-gated route serves 40/40. The 429s appear in
the JSON access log with queryable status_code and client_addr, so an attack
is visible in Loki. The wiring test identifies the dependency by qualname
rather than string search, and was mutation-checked by removing the limit from
/auth/me.
Also documents 401/403/429 in the API reference — 401 and 403 have existed
since auth landed but were never in the status-code table. Phase 4 is now
complete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The SvelteKit build was always made for the root (no base path); it
now mounts at / — registered last so /api/v1, /ws, /health, and /mcp
match first — and the JSON root endpoint is gone (its info lives in
/health and gateway_status). REST routers move from /api/* to
/api/v1/*; /ws and /health stay put; /mcp/ unchanged. Dashboard API
client, tests, README, and docs updated; dashboard rebuilt (build/ is
gitignored).
Verified live: / serves the UI, /api/v1 answers 200/401, the old
/api paths 404, MCP still lists 15 tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Complete project scaffolding and core implementation of an AI-powered
telephony system that calls companies, navigates IVR menus, waits on
hold, and transfers to the user when a human answers.
Key components:
- FastAPI server with REST API, WebSocket, and MCP (SSE) interfaces
- SIP/VoIP call management via PJSUA2 with RTP audio streaming
- LLM-powered IVR navigation using OpenAI/Anthropic with tool calling
- Hold detection service combining audio analysis and silence detection
- Real-time STT (Whisper/Deepgram) and TTS (OpenAI/Piper) pipelines
- Call recording with per-channel and mixed audio capture
- Event bus (asyncio pub/sub) for real-time client updates
- Web dashboard with live call monitoring
- SQLite persistence via SQLAlchemy with call history and analytics
- Notification support (email, SMS, webhook, desktop)
- Docker Compose deployment with Opal VoIP and Opal Media containers
- Comprehensive test suite with unit, integration, and E2E tests
- Simplified .gitignore and full project documentation in README
